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EUROPEAN APPORTIONMENT VIA THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPROMISE
GEOFFREY R. GRIMMETT
Abstract. Seven mathematicians and one political scientist met
at the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting in January 2011. They
agreed a unanimous recommendation to the European Parliament
for its future apportionments between the EUMember States. This
is a short factual account of the reasons that led to the Meeting, of
its debates and report, and of some of the ensuing Parliamentary
debate.
1. Background and Brief
1.1. Background. As the European Union has grown and its pop-
ulation has developed, so has the constitution and structure of the
European Parliament. In recognition of the need for an orderly al-
location of Parliamentary seats between the EU Member States, its
Committee on Contitutional Affairs (AFCO) commissioned a Sympo-
sium of Mathematicians to “identify a mathematical formula for the
distribution of seats which will be durable, transparent and impartial
to politics”. The purposes of the reform were described thus in [3]:
◦ The aim of the symposium is to discuss and, if possible, to
propose to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs a mathe-
matical formula for the redistribution of the 751 seats in the
European Parliament. The formula should be as transparent as
possible and capable of being sustained from one Parliamentary
mandate to the next.
◦ The purpose of the Symposium is to eliminate the political bar-
tering which has characterised the distribution of seats so far
by enabling a smooth reallocation of seats once every five years
which takes account of migration, demographic shifts and the
accession of new Member States.
Date: Revised August 20, 2011.
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The current note is more a record of the events surrounding the
Cambridge Apportionment Meeting than it is a critical analysis of the
politics. An account of the history of the current apportionment of
Parliament, and of the associated “political bartering”, may be found
in [2].
1.2. Cambridge Apportionment Meeting (CAM). The Sympo-
sium took place in the Centre for Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge
University, on 28–29 January 2011. The following participated:
◦ Geoffrey Grimmett (University of Cambridge), Director,
◦ Friedrich Pukelsheim (University of Augsburg), co-Director,
◦ Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier (E´cole Polytechnique, Paris),
◦ Victoriano Ramı´rez Gonza´lez (University of Granada),
◦ Richard Rose (University of Aberdeen; European University In-
stitute, Florence),
◦ Wojciech S lomczyn´ski (Jagiellonian University, Krako´w),
◦ Martin Zachariasen (University of Copenhagen),
◦ Karol Z˙yczkowski (Jagiellonian University, Krako´w),
advised by
◦ Andrew Duff MEP (AFCO Rapporteur),
◦ Rafa l Trzaskowski MEP (AFCO Vice-President),
◦ Guy Deregnaucourt (AFCO Administrator),
◦ Wolfgang Leonhardt (AFCO Administrator),
◦ Kevin Wilkins (Assistant to Andrew Duff),
in the presence of
◦ Thomas Kellermann (College of Europe, Natolin, Warsaw),
◦ Kai-Friederike Oelbermann (University of Augsburg).
The formal Report of the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting to the
Congressional Affairs Committee may be found at [5]. The discussions
and recommendations of CAM are summarized in the current article,
together with an account of some of the subsequent debate within the
Committee. Opinions expressed here are those of the author alone.
1.3. The constraints. Seat allocations are currently required to ad-
here to the terms of the Treaty of Lisbon.
◦ Each Member State is to receive a minimum of 6 seats,
◦ and a maximum of 96 seats,
◦ Parliament is constrained to have no more than 751 seats in
total (including that of the President),
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◦ allocations are required to satisfy a condition of “degressive
proportionality”.
CAM was advised by the AFCO representatives that the first three
constraints are indeed inequalities rather than equalities, but never-
theless there existed a general expectation in Parliament that its total
size should not be less than 751, and that the smallest States should
receive an allocation not greater than 6 seats. The issue of “degressive
proportionality” is formulated in more detail in Section 2. In reaching
its conclusions, the Symposium took into account the following addi-
tional observations concerning the general structure of the European
Parliament:
◦ the EU has currently 27 Member States,
◦ the smallest population (as published officially by Eurostat1 is
currently 412,970, and the largest 81,802,257,
◦ future accessions may include a number of States with a spread
of sizes,
◦ there will be migration and demographic changes,
◦ Member States’ population figures will be used as input to the
formula.
1.4. The criteria. Participants were sensitive in discussions to the
three descriptors provided by the AFCO Committee, namely that the
“formula” was required to be durable, transparent and impartial to
politics.
Durable: A formula that adapts naturally to possible structural changes
in the architecture of the EU, arising for example through accessions
by new States, through migration, or through demographic shifts.
Transparent : An apportionment method that is capable of simple
and reasonable explanation to EU citizens, irrespective of their back-
grounds.
Impartial to politics : A principled and fresh approach, unprejudiced
with respect to particular Member States or Political Groups, and free
of influence from historical positions beyond the constraints of Section
1.3.
1.5. Summary. A discussion of degressive proportionality is to be
found in Section 2. Section 3 contains a discussion of the main recom-
mendations of the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting, which are listed
explicitly in Section 4. A brief account of the subsequent debate and
resolutions of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs is presented in
1http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
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Section 5. This chapter in the story of European Apportionment ends
with the shelving of the mathematical approach.
2. Degressive Proportionality
2.1. Lamassoure–Severin definition. Degressive proportionality has
been defined in Paragraph 6 of the Lamassoure–Severin (2007) Motion
of [8] as follows.
6. [The European Parliament] “Considers that the principle of de-
gressive proportionality means that the ratio between the popu-
lation and the number of seats of each Member State must vary
in relation to their respective populations in such a way that
each Member from a more populous Member State represents
more citizens than each Member from a less populous Member
State and conversely, but also that no less populous Member
State has more seats than a more populous Member State.”
The principle of degressive proportionality attracted significant de-
bate and a major recommendation at CAM.
2.2. CAM recommendation. It was noted that degressive propor-
tionality comprises two requirements:
1. no smaller State shall receive more seats than a larger State,
2. the ratio population/seats shall increase as population increases.
Condition 1 is easy to accept. Condition 2, on the other hand, poses
a serious practical difficulty, and has in addition been violated in re-
cent Parliamentary apportionments. As noted in [9, 10, 11, 12] and
elsewhere, there are hypothetical instances of apportionment for which
there exists no solution satisfying both Condition 1 and Condition 2.
There was an extensive discussion of this issue at CAM, centred on the
following two Options.
A. Adopt a method whose outcomes invariably satisfy Condition
2 but with a possibly reduced Parliament-size.
B. Propose a change to the Lamassoure–Severin definition of de-
gressive proportionality lying within existing law and allowing
greater flexibility and transparency.
A method satisfying Option A was presented at CAM (and is sum-
marized in [5, Sect. 6.2]). However, CAM preferred Option B on the
grounds of transparency of method, and the desirability of achieving a
given Parliament-size.
The recommendation of CAM was to amend Paragraph 6 of the
Lamassoure–Severin Motion [8] through the addition of the italicized
phrase as follows.
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6. [The European Parliament] Considers that the principle of de-
gressive proportionality means that the ratio between the pop-
ulation and the number of seats of each Member State before
rounding to whole numbers must vary in relation to their re-
spective populations in such a way that each Member from a
more populous Member State represents more citizens than each
Member from a less populous Member State and conversely, but
also that no less populous Member State has more seats than a
more populous Member State.
3. Cambridge Compromise
3.1. Base+prop method. The ‘Cambridge Compromise’ recommen-
dation2 to the European Parliament is to adopt a base+prop system,
formulated in [10] as follows.
The base+prop method proceeds in two stages. At the first stage, a
fixed base number of seats is allocated to each Member State. At the
second stage, the remaining seats are allocated to States in proportion
to their population-sizes (subject to rounding, and capping at the max-
imum). In order to achieve the given Parliament-size, one introduces
a further ingredient called the divisor.
For given base b, maximum M , and divisor d, define the associated
allocation function Ad : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) by
Ad(p) = min
{
b+ p/d,M
}
,
The base+prop method is formulated as follows in mathematical terms.
1. Assign to a Member State with population p the seat share
Ad(p),
2. perform a rounding of the seat share Ad(p) into an integer seat
number [Ad(p)],
3. adjust the divisor d in such a way that the sum of the seat
numbers of all Member States equals the given Parliament-size.
The total house-size with divisor d is
T (d) =
∑
i
[Ad(pi)],
2The Cambridge Compromise proposal is named in harmony with the so-called
Jagiellonian Compromise proposal of [13, 15] for voting within the European
Commission.
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where the summation is over all Member States. The value of d is
chosen in such a way that T (d) equals the prescribed total3.
The CAM recommendation is to use the base b = 5, and to use
rounding upwards. Outcomes of the Cambridge Compromise are pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2, with 2011 population figures taken from the
Eurostat website, and with 27, 28, and 29 Member States.
It was through principled discussion that this recommendation was
reached; CAM was instructed to overlook historical apportionments,
including the status quo as listed in Table 2. Participants recognised
the challenges that can be presented by change, and these challenges
proved formidable for the AFCO Committee (see Section 5).
3.2. Why base+prop? The CAM participants considered a variety of
apportionment schemes based around several different linear and non-
linear apportionment functions4. Linear functions were preferred over
non-linear functions on grounds of transparency and greater potential
for proportionality. The dual constraints of maximum and house-size
are obstacles to the search for a smooth linear apportionment function
(that is, a function that is continuously differentiable, say).
Non-linear apportionment functions (following a power5 or para-
bolic law, for example) can accommodate numerical constraints in a
smoother manner. They can be used to fit curves to plots of data
points distributed along (possibly concave) lines of trends, such as the
current allocations to Member States. On the other hand, they suffer
from arbitrariness, and from lack of transparency. The exercise con-
fronting CAM was not one of fitting a curve to historic data, but rather
to form a fresh view of apportionment that is impartial to yesterday’s
politics.
From amongst linear systems, the base+prop method stands out for
its transparency. It is degressively proportional in an active way, since
the base operates to the profit of Member States at the lower end of
the population table. CAM considered that its simplicity outweighed
the discontinuity in the first derivative that arises currently through
the maximum cap of 96 seats. We noted that this discontinuity will
diminish as the EU changes its shape through accessions. The rec-
ommendation to adopt the base+prop method was reached through
3There is normally an interval of such d-values, and there are standard ap-
proaches to the question of so-called ties. See [1], for example, and also Section
3.4.
4Note that every non-decreasing concave apportionment function leads invariably
to allocations satisfying the revised form of degressive proportionality of Section 2.2.
5A power-weighted variant of the Cambridge Compromise is analysed in [4].
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consideration of durability, transparency, impartiality, and degressive
proportionality.
CAM noted in passing that the base+prop method can be inter-
preted as one in which the base is an allocation to Member States, and
the remaining seats (prop) are proportional to population (subject to
capping at the maximum). This resonates with the founding principles
of the EU, enshrined in the Treaty, that the Union is made up both of
Member States (enjoying equality in international law) and of citizens
(enjoying democratic equality).
3.3. Choice of base and rounding method. The choices of base
and rounding methods are intertwined. A smaller base tends to favour
larger States; rounding upwards is usually viewed as tending to favour
smaller States. These choices are informed by the existence of a mini-
mum number m of seats per State, and by degressive proportionality.
Let us write b+R to denote the system with base b and rounding
method R, where R may denote one of:
U: upwards rounding,
S: standard rounding to the nearest integer,
D: downwards rounding.
We say that the roundings of a real number x are well defined if x is not
an integer multiple of 1
2
. It was considered preferable, in the interests
of transparency, that the base be an integer.
Recall that m = 6, and there is an expectation that the smallest
States will indeed receive 6 seats. It was therefore natural to concen-
trate on the two possibilities:
6+S: base b = 6, standard rounding (S),
5+U: base b = 5, upwards rounding (U).
Each of these two systems allocates at least 6 seats to every State. The
minimum allocation is however fragile under the first system (6+S),
as illustrated in [5, Sect. 5.3] as follows. The currently smallest Mem-
ber State is Malta, with a population of 412,970, and it receives an
allocation of 6 seats under both the above systems. If, however, its
population were to increase by only 8,000 (other populations remaining
unchanged), its allocation under 6+S rises to 7. This was considered
unacceptable, and for this reason CAM recommended 5+U.
There is an explicit trade-off between base and rounding method (see
[6, 7, 14]). Let x be a real number, and let ⌊·⌋ (respectively, ⌈·⌉, [·])
denote rounding downwards (respectively, upwards, and to the nearest
integer). For any ‘base’ b, we have
⌈b+ x⌉ = [b+ 1
2
+ x] = ⌊b+ 1 + x⌋,
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whenever the roundings are well defined. Subject to the last assump-
tion, the three systems b+U, (b+ 1
2
)+S, (b+ 1)+D result in the same
allocations. In this sense, the systems 5+U, 51
2
+S, 6+D are equivalent.
3.4. Divisors or D’Hondt? Democracies have extensive experience
of voting systems, and a variety of nomenclature has evolved. The
following trans-Atlantic translation chart is included here.
rounding Europe USA
downwards D’Hondt Jefferson
standard Sainte-Lague¨ Webster
upwards Adams
The Cambridge Compromise may be reformulated as a system of any
of these three types, and we illustrate this with the case of D’Hondt’s
method. Allocate to every State the minimum m seats (currently m =
6). The remaining seats are allocated according to D’Hondt’s method
subject to the condition that, when any State attains a total of 96 seats,
then it receives no further seats. The ensuing allocation is identical to
that of the Cambridge Compromise.
The better to aid the reader, we give a brief explanation of the
relevant D’Hondt method in the presence of an integral base and max-
imum. Write B (respectively, M) for the base (respectively, maxi-
mum) allocation, and H for the house-size. Let the population-sizes
be p1, p2, . . . , pn.
1. At stage 0, allocate B seats to every State. The remaining
R = H − nB seats will be allocated sequentially as follows,
until none remain.
2. Suppose, at some stage, that State i has been allocated ai seats
in all. Find a State j such that pj/(aj −B + 1) is a maximum,
and allocate the next seat to this State.
3. Repeat the previous step until no seats remain, subject to the
condition that any State achieving the maximum number M of
seats is removed from the process.
It may be checked that the outcome agrees with the system B+D,
which was shown in Section 3.3 to be equivalent to the Cambridge
Compromise with base b = B − 1. Similar algorithms are of course
valid for the Sainte-Lague¨ and Adams methods.
Ties can occur in the above algorithm, and these correspond to the
non-existence of a divisor for some house-size in the formulation of
Section 3.1. There are standard ways of breaking ties by casting lots.
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Member State Population Seats
Popn/seats Popn/seats
before after
rounding rounding
1 Germany 81,802,257 96 852,106.8 852,106.8
2 France 64,714,074 85 770,259.3 761,342.0
3 UK 62,008,048 81 768,264.0 765,531.5
4 Italy 60,340,328 79 766,950.8 763,801.6
5 Spain 45,989,016 62 752,036.4 741,758.3
6 Poland 38,167,329 52 739,643.2 733,987.1
7 Romania 21,462,186 32 687,772.5 670,693.3
8 Netherlands 16,574,989 26 656,745.2 637,499.6
9 Greece 11,305,118 19 601,222.1 595,006.2
10 Belgium 10,839,905 19 594,438.5 570,521.3
11 Portugal 10,637,713 18 591,356.6 590,984.1
12 Czech Rep. 10,506,813 18 589,315.9 583,711.8
13 Hungary 10,014,324 18 581,298.7 556,351.3
14 Sweden 9,340,682 17 569,380.7 549,451.9
15 Austria 8,375,290 16 550,056.4 523,455.6
16 Bulgaria 7,563,710 15 531,334.8 504,247.3
17 Denmark 5,534,738 12 470,724.2 461,228.2
18 Slovakia 5,424,925 12 466,706.8 452,077.1
19 Finland 5,351,427 12 463,965.8 445,952.2
20 Ireland 4,467,854 11 427,330.9 406,168.5
21 Lithuania 3,329,039 10 367,250.6 332,903.9
22 Latvia 2,248,374 8 290,290.0 281,046.8
23 Slovenia 2,046,976 8 272,953.4 255,872.0
24 Estonia 1,340,127 7 201,939.0 191,446.7
25 Cyprus 803,147 6 134,291.1 133,857.8
26 Luxembourg 502,066 6 89,446.6 83,677.7
27 Malta 412,970 6 75,027.7 68,828.3
Total 501,103,425 751
Table 1. Each State receives one non-base seat for ev-
ery 819,000 citizens or part thereof. Population/seat ra-
tios are strictly decreasing before rounding, but there
are two violations after rounding, namely Belgium and
France when reading for the bottom. Data in this
and the next table are taken from the Eurostat website
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/.
10 GEOFFREY R. GRIMMETT
Member State Population Now
Seats Seats Seats
27 States 28 States 29 States
1 Germany 81,802,257 99 96 96 96
2 France 64,714,074 74 85 83 82
3 UK 62,008,048 73 81 80 79
4 Italy 60,340,328 73 79 78 77
5 Spain 45,989,016 54 62 61 60
6 Poland 38,167,329 51 52 51 51
7 Romania 21,462,186 33 32 31 31
8 Netherlands 16,574,989 26 26 25 25
9 Greece 11,305,118 22 19 19 19
10 Belgium 10,839,905 22 19 18 18
11 Portugal 10,637,713 22 18 18 18
12 Czech Rep. 10,506,813 22 18 18 18
13 Hungary 10,014,324 22 18 17 17
14 Sweden 9,340,682 20 17 17 17
15 Austria 8,375,290 19 16 16 15
16 Bulgaria 7,563,710 18 15 15 14
17 Denmark 5,534,738 13 12 12 12
18 Slovakia 5,424,925 13 12 12 12
19 Finland 5,351,427 13 12 12 12
20 Ireland 4,467,854 12 11 11 11
21 Croatia 4,425,747 – – 11 11
22 Lithuania 3,329,039 12 10 9 9
23 Latvia 2,248,374 9 8 8 8
24 Slovenia 2,046,976 8 8 8 8
25 Estonia 1,340,127 6 7 7 7
26 Cyprus 803,147 6 6 6 6
27 Luxembourg 502,066 6 6 6 6
28 Malta 412,970 6 6 6 6
29 Iceland 317,630 – – – 6
Total 505,529,172 751 751 751 754
Table 2. The column labelled ‘27 States’ is the Cam-
bridge Compromise with the present European Union.
The next two columns include Croatia and Iceland in
that order. The divisors are 819,000 (27 States), 835,000
(28 States), 844,000 (29 States).
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However, ties are very unlikely to occur in instances of the EU ap-
portionment problem since populations are large and varied. Indeed,
subject to a reasonable probabilistic model for population-sizes, the
probability of a tie may estimated rigorously.
For further reading, see [6], or perhaps [1, p. 99],
3.5. Choosing the minimum and maximum. The better to un-
derstand the role of the minimum, CAM discussed how the minimum
and base could be reduced as further States accede to the Union. No
final recommendation was reached but two Schemes emerged.
In Scheme A, a cap is introduced on the proportion of seats allocated
via the minimum, and the value of the minimum is taken as large as
possible subject to this cap. For example, there are currently 27× 6 =
162 seats allocated thus, a proportion of approximately 22%. If, for
example, one caps this at 25%, the minimum remains at 6 for a larger
Union of 27–31 States, and is reduced to 5 for 32–37 States, and so on.
The base b might either be one fewer than the minimum (with rounding
upwards), or might follow a rule of the type: b is the smallest fraction
such that the smallest State receives exactly the minimum number of
seats (with rounding upwards, say).
In Scheme B, one determines the base as a function of the num-
ber n of States, and current practice indicates a formula of the type
b = 135/n. This has the advantage of decreasing steadily as n in-
creases. However, the associated minimum decreases in a manner that
is sensitive to the smallest population.
Since each State receives by necessity an integral number of seats,
one effect of the allocation of seats to new States is a notable lumpi-
ness at the upper end of the population chart. With the minimum
held constant, the seats granted to an acceding State are taken from
other States in proportion to their populations, and thus mostly from
the larger States. Conversely, any adjustment downwards in the mini-
mum allocation releases seats for proportional distribution between the
States, of which the largest States gain most.
CAM recommended that consideration be given to the manner in
which the minimum allocation should vary in the light of changes to
the European Union, and also that the functioning of the maximum
allocation be reviewed prior to future apportionments.
3.6. Population statistics. Census data is key to the allocation of
seats in the European Parliament. Such population data is usually
collected only once a decade. Both the year of the census and the
manner of updating can vary between countries. In addition, there
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can be national variation in the definition of a resident. CAM’s final
recommendation was that the European Commission be encouraged to
ensure that Eurostat review the methods used across the Union.
4. Summary of Recommendations
Principal recommendations
1. Adopt the revised definition of degressive proportionality pro-
posed in Section 2.2 above.
2. For future apportionments of the European Parliament, the
method base+prop should be employed.
3. The base should be 5, and fractions should be rounded upwards.
Further recommendations
A. Due consideration should be given to the manner in which the
minimum, currently 6, and base should vary in the light of
future changes in the number of Member States in the European
Union.
B. The European Parliament should review the manner of func-
tioning of the maximum constraint on number of seats, cur-
rently 96, prior to future apportionments.
C. The Commission should be encouraged to ensure that Euro-
stat reviews the methods used by Member States in calculating
their current populations, in order to ensure accuracy and con-
sistency.
5. Debate in the AFCO Committee
The timetable of discussion in Brussels was as follows. In advance of
completion of the final CAM Report, the author was invited (as Direc-
tor of CAM) to deliver a preview to the Committee on Constitutional
Affairs (AFCO) in Brussels on 7 February 2011. There was a Com-
mittee discussion on 15 March. The Rapporteur, Andrew Duff, tabled
a proposal “for a modification of the Act concerning the election of
the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage
of 20 September 1976”, and this was the subject of amendments by
Committee members, leading in turn to a set of so-called “Compro-
mise Amendments” from the Rapporteur6. A vote was taken on 19
April 2011.
6Video recordings of the two meetings may be found at
http://tinyurl.com/5s63d8r. Versions of the proposals and amendments
may be consulted at http://tinyurl.com/6bzedza.
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The initial responses of Committee members to the CAM recom-
mendation varied between curiosity verging on support, a desire for
clarification, simple misunderstanding, and downright opposition. Sev-
eral members expressed dismay at the “political” challenges of such a
reorganization, and everyone was doubtless sensitive to the needs of
Member States, Political Groups, and individual Members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament. Amongst the issues that stimulated some MEPs
were the changes in allocations to Member States with populations in
the 7–11 million range, and the claim by one MEP of unfair treatment
of the largest Member State.
The five week intermission between the two Committee meetings per-
mitted a period of reflection and analysis, and contributions at the sec-
ond meeting were generally more refined. There was some agreement in
principle on the desirability of a formulaic approach to apportionment,
but only one speaker (apart from the Rapporteur) spoke in support of
the Cambridge Compromise. Representatives of several medium-sized
countries were particularly implacable.
Committee members tabled 138 amendments to the Rapporteur’s
Proposal for a modification of the relevant Act. The final three were
proposals to employ, respectively, the Cambridge Compromise, a para-
bolic method, and a power method. These three amendments were not
destined to survive the vote, presumably as the consequences of for-
mulaic approaches became clearer to some members of the Committee
and of Parliament.
Two of the Rapporteur’s twelve “Compromise Amendments” were
directly relevant to the Cambridge Compromise. Amendment B pro-
posed a formal definition of degressive proportionality along the lines
of Section 2.2, while withdrawing the proposal to adopt a specific
mathematical approach. Amendment F compressed the discussion of
a “mathematical formula” as follows:
[The European Parliament] “Proposes to enter into a dia-
logue with the European Council to explore the possibil-
ity of reaching agreement on a durable7 and transparent
mathematical formula for the apportionment of seats in
the Parliament respecting the criteria laid down in the
Treaties and the principles of plurality between political
parties and solidarity among States.”
These Compromise Amendments were agreed by the Committee on 19
April 2011, and the amended Proposal was duly carried.
7Italics by the current author. Recall the three criteria of Section 1.4; the crite-
rion of “impartiality” has been omitted.
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It is not the purpose of this paper to speculate about the reasons for
the unenthusiastic response of the AFCO Committee to this proposal
in particular, and to formulaic approaches in general. Change can be
tricky to manage and to explain to electorates, especially fundamental
change requiring unanimity across EU Member States and affecting the
livelihoods and ambitions of individual MEPs. The current allocations
give preferential treatment to citizens of medium-sized States at the
expense of those of larger States. The tentacles of the Political Groups
entangle the EU, and alliances harness power and can frustrate change.
There is also the problem of the largest State. According to the
Treaty of Lisbon, no State shall receive more than 96 seats, whereas
an uncapped allocation would currently give a greater number to Ger-
many. This feature of Parliamentary structure is illuminated baldly
by the Cambridge Compromise using current population figures (the
prominence of this cap will fade as the EU is enlarged).
It was argued by some MEPs that, in preferring a linear system,
CAM had misunderstood the meaning of “degressive proportionality”.
Such critics considered that CAM should have designed a formula to
reproduce the current profile of Parliament. Not only is this contrary
to the terms of reference received from the AFCO Committee, but also
the author believes that mathematics is best not used as a tool to
legitimize blatantly political deals.
The argument provides, however, a clue as to why formulaic ap-
proaches were disfavoured in the vote. Calculations indicate that, as
the number of Member States increases, the allocations of many for-
mulaic systems approach the simple linearity of the Cambridge Com-
promise. For example, with 29 States (including Croatia and Iceland)
the allocations of both the parabolic and power methods differ only
very slightly from that of the Cambridge formula. It seems that the
mid-range bulge can be preserved only through “political bartering”,
and that the discussion of this paper will resurface in the future.
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